Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory

Abstract

Arguments over Salt II will avoid some needed discussion of basic strategies. The author questions the value of arms control negotiations and weapons systems evaluations when there is no firm strategic force posture. He points out that failure to deter attack will leave the country in an acute crisis and the president with the options of surrender or proceeding without a clear strategy. The evolution of pre-war deterrence as a policy of assured destruction is outlined and examined in terms of whether the concept is rational or likely to be effective in the long run. Arguments of the two schools of thought - military equivalency and counter-military targeting - are summarized and, while some advances are noted in recent years, there is still a need to establish stability criteria in US defense planning.

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