Regulatory Negotiation versus Conventional Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence

Abstract

Based on a survey of participants in eight negotiated rule makings at the Environmental Protection Agency and in six comparable conventional EPA rule makings, we find that, when the rule is negotiated, there is greater satisfaction with the substance of the final rule (e.g., net benefits to the respondent's organization, general effectiveness/efficiency) and with the overall process. Participants in negotiated rules also learn more, but they face higher costs. Rules selected for negotiation appear more complex and involve detailed issues of compliance. There is no difference between the rule makings in the perceived net benefits of participation, in the perception of parties being left out or a party with disproportionate influence, in the overall responsiveness of EPA to public participation, or in the amount of litigation. The results are consistent with theoretical arguments that support the benefits of face-to-face negotiation among affected parties under certain circumstances, but they leave important questions about efficiency and equity unanswered

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