Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation

Alan D. Morrison · Lucy White Z

112 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Finance

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Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Global Financial Crisis and Policies Global Financial Regulation and Crises

Abstract

ABSTRACT We analyze the desirability of level playing fields in international financial regulation. In general, level playing fields impose the standards of the weakest regulator upon the best‐regulated economies. However, they may be desirable when capital is mobile because they counter a cherry‐picking effect that lowers the size and efficiency of banks in weaker economies. Hence, while a laissez faire policy favors the better‐regulated economy, level playing fields are good for weaker regulators. We show that multinational banking mitigates the cherry‐picking effect, and reduces the damage that a level playing field causes in the better‐regulated economy.

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References

2000Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?1999Determinants of Commercial Bank Interest Margins and Profitability: Some International Evidence 1998The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing and Developed Countries 2001How does foreign entry affect domestic banking markets?2004Effects on Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence 2000Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real Activity in the United States 1995The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates 2002Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-listings in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings

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