Utilitarianism and Past and Future Mistakes

Abstract

Important among differences that distinguish utilitarian principles, though all but eclipsed in recent preoccupation with act-rule differences and differences in the extent to which principles make what an agent ought to do depend on the actions of others, are differences in the extent to which principles make what an agent ought to do depend on his own actions, what he has done on previous occasions and will or would do on subsequent occasions. Utilitarian principles sound the gamut in this dimension, from no such dependence, thr6ugh dependence on only past actions, to dependence on future actions as well. The question is what, for utilitarians, is the right measure of dependence? To isolate issues, and to free them as much as possible from various complexities, for example regarding consequences and value, I first set out relatively simple and uniform principles that differ only in the stated dimension. Then an artificial case is constructed and these principles brought to bear upon it. Next, similarities and differences in directives for the primary case and, more briefly, several others are displayed and the relative merits of the principles as guides to action assessed. I cite considerations which while not 'demonstrative' are sufficient, I think, to dispose at least act-utilitarians to view the principles as forming a progression not only in degrees of dependency but also in orders of reasonableness. After this, and very briefly, initial responses are set out to several large objections to the principle I favor.

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