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Can a powerful CEO avoid involuntary replacement?—An empirical study from China · Study

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ArticleCan a powerful CEO avoid involuntary replacement?—An empirical study from China

PI Li-li2009

Article2009

Can a powerful CEO avoid involuntary replacement?—An empirical study from China

PI Li-li · Julian F. Lowe

64 citations·0/0 files stored·Asia Pacific Journal of Management

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Corporate Finance and Governance Gender Diversity and Inequality Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

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References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 2021Econometric Analysis of Panel Data 2011External Control of Organizations: Resource Dependence Perspective 1979The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective 1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control 1984Structural Inertia and Organizational Change 1983Agency Problems and Residual Claims 1988Outside directors and CEO turnover

Cited by

2013Outward foreign direct investment of publicly listed firms from China: A corporate governance perspective 2018How does an intra-family succession effect strategic change and performance in China’s family firms?2017Institutional relatedness behind product diversification and international diversification 2019Leadership succession in different types of organizations: What business and political successions may learn from each other 2010The private benefits of control in Chinese listed firms: Do cash flow rights always reduce controlling shareholders’ tunneling?

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Year2009

Typearticle

Published2009-10-26

VenueAsia Pacific Journal of Management

ISSN-L0217-4561

Languageen

Citations64

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.1007/s10490-009-9178-8

openalex_workW2028891815

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2020The potential impact of managerial entrenchment on firms’ corporate social responsibility activities and financial performance: evidence from Iran

2020Corporate ownership and managerial turnover in China and Eastern Europe: A comparative meta-analysis

2013Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on tunneling in China's listed firms