An Examination of the Effects of Managerial Procedural Safeguards, Managerial Likeability, and Type of Fraudulent Act on Intentions to Report Fraud to a Manager

Steven E. Kaplan · Kelly Richmond Pope · Janet A. Samuels

39 citations0/0 files storedBehavioral Research in Accounting

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Ethics in Business and Education Accounting and Financial Management Financial Literacy and Behavior

Abstract

ABSTRACT Only a fraction of employees who discover fraud report this information. Given the serious consequences of fraud, better understanding factors influencing individuals' intentions to report fraud, particularly to a non-anonymous recipient such as a manager, is important. We predict that reporting intentions to a manager will be influenced by attributes of the firm (e.g., whether managerial procedural safeguards are strong or weak), the report recipient (e.g., whether the manager is likeable or unlikeable), and the type of fraud (e.g., misappropriation of assets or fraudulent financial reporting). Results from this experimental study indicate that managerial likeability and the type of fraud, but not managerial procedural safeguards or the interaction with managerial likeability, significantly influence reporting intentions to a manager. We contend that participants are influenced by managerial likeability because it provides specific information about the manager and acts as a signal about how the manager will likely handle a fraud report. These results, consistent with previous research (Robinson, Robertson, and Curtis 2012), suggest that participants make stronger attributions to a person engaging in misappropriation of assets compared to a person engaging in fraudulent financial reporting. Implications of this study to the practitioner and academic communities are discussed.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 39 citations exist upstream.

References

1980Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences.2005The economic implications of corporate financial reporting 1996Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*2002Trust in leadership: Meta-analytic findings and implications for research and practice.2000The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits 1968Likableness ratings of 555 personality-trait words.2007Why Does Affect Matter in Organizations?2005Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation

Cited by

2018Audit firm tenure, auditor familiarity, and trust: Effect on auditee whistleblowing reporting intentions 2022Factors influencing internal whistleblowing. A systematic review of the literature 2018The Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility and Wrongdoer Rank on Whistleblowing 2021Employee Sensitivity to the Risk of Whistleblowing via Social Media: The Role of Social Media Strategy and Policy 2019Are not-for-profit employees more willing (or likely) to be whistleblowers?

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.