Article2000

Buyer Beware? Presidential Success through Supreme Court Appointments

Jeffrey A. Segal · Richard J. Timpone · Robert Matthew Howard

122 citations0/0 files storedPolitical Research Quarterly

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Judicial and Constitutional Studies Electoral Systems and Political Participation American Constitutional Law and Politics

Abstract

One manner in which Presidents attempt to have an enduring policy influence is through the appointment of like-minded justices to the Supreme Court. This article empirically examines Dahl's (1957) hypothesis that justices actually support the policy preferences of the Presidents who appoint them. We study concordance with new data for measuring presidential preferences in the domains of social and economic policy and by incorporating the notion of judicial change over time. We measure presidential preferences for the modern Presidents, Franklin Roosevelt through Bill Clinton, with a survey taken from a random sample of political science scholars who study the Presidency We measure the voting behavior of the President's Supreme Court appointees through their votes in civil liberties and economics cases from 1937 to 1994. Presidents appear to be reasonably successful in their appointments in the short run, but justices on average appear to deviate over time away from the Presidents who appointed them.

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References

1979Reliability and Validity Assessment 2011Reliability and Validity Assessment 1949Rank Correlation Methods.1995Dynamic Representation 1989A Directional Theory of Issue Voting 2005Supreme Court Decision Making 1992Rank Correlation Methods (5th ed.).1993The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions

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