Managing and transforming policy stigmas in international finance: Emerging markets and controlling capital inflows after the crisis

Abstract

The past three decades have shown the increasing importance of the efforts of the international financial community to socialize emerging markets to accept norms of financial governance. Social sanctions often have been used to mark non-compliant states and their policies as deviant. Yet, we know little about how deviant states strategically manage such policy stigmas in international finance and how this management shapes the international normative order. Recent scholarship in international relations suggests that stigma management strategies tend to either reinforce or fracture the international normative order. This article, by contrast, contends that such strategies also have the potential to transform the international normative order so that it resembles more closely the preferences of the deviant. This argument is illustrated using evidence drawn from Brazil and South Korea's management of the policy stigma associated with controls on capital inflows.

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