Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups

Abstract

Rational choice theories have difficulty accounting for individual participation in collective action. Voting is among the acts hardest to explain; consumption benefits have been proposed to account for nonzero turnout. The model presented here establishes a political investment basis for these benefits. I argue that voters often act not in isolation but as part of groups with shared interests. While individuals still vote because of consumption benefits arising from the act of voting, some of these consumption benefits are provided by group leaders out of collective benefits received by the group in return for its votes. The collective benefit comes from a candidate adopting policy positions closer to those of the group. In passing, I show that the widespread availability of public opinion polling increases the candidate's incentive to shift position. Finally, some data from recent off-year elections are shown to be consistent with the model.

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