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Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems · Study

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ArticleLearning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems

Bary Pradelski2012

Article2012

Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems

Bary Pradelski · H. Peyton Young

134 citations·0/0 files stored·Games and Economic Behavior

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

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Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 134 citations exist upstream.

References

1993The Evolution of Conventions 1993Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games 1993The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction 2001Algorithms, games, and the internet 1999Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions 2006Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy 2016Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy 2009Cooperative Control and Potential Games

Cited by

2018Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance 2015Empirical Centroid Fictitious Play: An Approach for Distributed Learning in Multi-Agent Games 2018Learning Generalized Nash Equilibria in a Class of Convex Games 2012Achieving pareto optimality through distributed learning 2022The Confluence of Networks, Games, and Learning a Game-Theoretic Framework for Multiagent Decision Making Over Networks 2016Learning in a black box 2017Random Deviations Improve Micro–Macro Predictions: An Empirical Test

Details

Year2012

Typearticle

Published2012-03-09

VenueGames and Economic Behavior

ISSN-L0899-8256

Languageen

Citations134

Files0 public / 0

ShelfGame Theory and Applications

Identifiers

doi10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.017

openalex_workW2032200533

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