Some Implications of Auditor and Client Lobbying Activities: A Comparative Analysis

Abstract

This paper examines the degree to which auditor and client lobbying is related in a UK context. This may help to identify any linkage between the wealth of clients and auditors that is affected by accounting standards, as propounded in the ‘economic consequences’ literature. It also might have some implications for the independence question. Three tests are conducted to see if auditors tend to support the lobbying position of the majority, or the most financially influential, of their clients. The third test is also used to identify any evidence that the comments of smaller clients tend to follow the lead of their audit firms/professional advisors. Auditor and corporate client written submissions on 22 proposed accounting standards are included in the study. The analyses are conducted both at an aggregated and also at a disaggregated level. The results do not indicate that auditor and client collusion took place. In particular, the results are consistent with the view that auditors are independent of their clients. Some suggestions are made for further research.

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