Explaining Economic Assistance By Non‐Democratic Regimes: A Statistical Analysis of Authoritarian Aid to Less Developed Countries

Abstract

This study examines the factors that account for patterns of economic aid distribution by authoritarian donors. The aid allocation decisions of four types of authoritarian political systems—Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, People's Republic of China, and members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries—are compared with those of the United States for the period 1976–1989. A model of donor decision‐making incorporating political, trade, and developmental objectives is applied to the aid activities of each donor type, using a pooled cross‐sectional time series design. The results indicate substantial variation in the objectives underlying the economic aid activities of different types of authoritarian donors, as well as some similarities between types of authoritarian donors and the US. These differences make it difficult to generalize about the aid allocation behavior of authoritarian regimes and pose a challenge to cumulation of research about the bilateral aid allocation process.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 0 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.