Unilateral Concessions From the Other Party: Concession Behavior, Attributions, and Negotiation Judgments.

Abstract

This article examines the effects of the other party's concession behavior on a negotiator's satisfaction and judgments. The timing of the concessions (immediate, gradual, delayed) and the justifications provided by the other party (negotiator skill vs. external constraints) were manipulated using a scenario method (Study 1) and a role-playing experiment (Study 2). Study 1 showed that concession timing influenced valuation of the object and satisfaction with the partner and the outcome. Justifications about why the concession was made interacted with concession timing to influence participants' attributions. Participants' attributions for why the concession was actually made, in turn, had a main effect on satisfaction and judgments of the negotiation. Study 2 replicated some, but not all, of these findings.

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