Negligence and Moral Responsibility

Abstract

It is commonly accepted that one can be morally responsible for negligent behavior and its consequences. It is also commonly accepted that one cannot be morally responsible for occurrences over which one had no control. It is not clear how these beliefs are to be reconciled; for negligent behavior involves inadvertence, and yet the control which appears requisite for moral responsibility itself seems to require that one advert to one's behavior and its consequences. In this paper I shall provide an account of negligence according to which negligence involves both advertence and inadvertence to one and the same event, and I shall thereby seek to show how it is that one can be morally responsible for negligent behavior and its consequences. The paper will have two main sections: in the first I shall present my account of negligence, and in the second I shall discuss moral responsibility for negligence. There will be two appendices: in the first I shall discuss the issue of legal responsibility for negligence, and in the second I shall discuss the concepts of rashness and recklessness.

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