The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice

Lin Cong Zhou

147 citations0/0 files storedGames and Economic Behavior

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Fixed Point Theorems Analysis

Abstract

A Tarski-type fixed point theorem for an ascending correspondence on a complete lattice is proved and then applied to show that the set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C70, C72.

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