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Group decision-making theory and behavior under performance-based water quality payments
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Group decision-making theory and behavior under performance-based water quality payments (2011)Group decision-making theory and behavior…OPTIMAL MULTI‐AGENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TEAM CONTRACTS (2008)OPTIMAL MULTI‐AGENT PERFORMAN…COMMUNICATION AND INCENTIVE MECHANISMS BASED ON GROUP PERFORMANCE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF NONPOINT POLLUTION CONTROL (2006)COMMUNICATION AND INCENTIVE M…Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments: An Experimental Study (2005)Efficiency of Nonpoint Source…Testing ambient pollution instruments with heterogeneous agents (2004)Testing ambient pollution ins…Economics of Water Quality Protection from Nonpoint Sources: Theory and Practice (1999)Economics of Water Quality Pr…Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple Choices (1998)Ambient Taxes When Polluters …A Damage Based Tax Mechanism for Regulation of Non-Point Emissions (1998)A Damage Based Tax Mechanism …Optimal Contracts for Teams (1991)Optimal Contracts for TeamsUncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control (1988)Uncertainty and incentives fo…Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams (1987)Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse T…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsThe Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard (1991)Economics of Water Quality Protection from Nonpoint Sources: Theory and Practice (1999)Exploring the Performance of Ambient‐Based Policy Instruments When Nonpoint Source Polluters Can Cooperate (2004)Voluntary‐Threat Approaches to Reduce Ambient Water Pollution (2010)Incentives in Teams (1973)Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations (1991)Personal Selling and Sales Management: A Relationship Marketing Perspective (1999)Optimal Incentives for Teams (2001)Research Issues in Nonpoint Pollution Control (1998)The Economics of Non-Point-Source Pollution (2010)African Economic Research Consortium (2013)The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values (2014)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (1994)A Laboratory Experiment to Compare Two Market Institutions for Emissions Trading (2010)Environmental regulation, agricultural green technology innovation, and agricultural green total factor productivity (2022)Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects (2002)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Behavioral and Experimental Agri-Environmental Research: Methodological Challenges, Literature Gaps, and Recommendations (2019)A Course in Game Theory (1994)The Handbook of experimental economics (1995)Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition (1983)Monitoring Agents with Other Agents (1989)Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics (1991)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Monitoring and enforcement of environmental policy (1999)Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance (2000)Enforcement and over-compliance (2007)Differences in Social and Public Risk Perceptions and Conflicting Impacts on Point/Nonpoint Trading Ratios (2001)Valuing environmental benefits of silvopasture practice: a case study of the Lake Okeechobee watershed in Florida (2004)Economics and Environmental Markets: Lessons from Water-Quality Trading (2013)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1988Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control643 cited
  • 1991Optimal Contracts for Teams223 cited
  • 1987Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams196 cited
  • 1998Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple Choices121 cited
  • 1999Economics of Water Quality Protection from Nonpoint Sources: Theory and Practice121 cited
  • 2005Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments: An Experimental Study96 cited
  • 2006COMMUNICATION AND INCENTIVE MECHANISMS BASED ON GROUP PERFORMANCE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF NONPOINT POLLUTION CONTROL72 cited
  • 1998A Damage Based Tax Mechanism for Regulation of Non-Point Emissions70 cited
  • 2004Testing ambient pollution instruments with heterogeneous agents46 cited
  • 2008OPTIMAL MULTI‐AGENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TEAM CONTRACTS36 cited

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