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An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
5 references·12 citing·34 second hopsampled
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References

  • 2001Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency370 cited
  • 2005The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices261 cited
  • 2001Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities230 cited
  • 2006On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive164 cited
  • 2005Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders164 cited

Cited by

  • 2008On the Hardness of Being Truthful146 cited
  • 2009On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive144 cited
  • 2008Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions125 cited
  • 2005Inapproximability Results for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Utility Functions94 cited
  • 2011An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations88 cited
  • 2007Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms62 cited
  • 2011From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms58 cited
  • 2016Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions57 cited
  • 2009On the Computational Power of Demand Queries56 cited
  • 2010Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions

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48 cited
  • 2011Limitations of Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions40 cited
  • 2014Economic efficiency requires interaction40 cited