On the Distinctive Features of Ecological Laws

Abstract

Ecological psychology is grounded in the assumption of the availability of lawlike regularities in the world as the basis of reliable information for perceiving-acting systems. This article aims to articulate some of the necessary conditions for an account of lawfulness that accommodates ecological theories of perceiving and acting. This attempt considers historically influential accounts of laws but offers modifications of the notions of law and especially of cause that are of greater relevance to the practice of an ecological science. A guiding assumption is that the laws of the animate are the most general. The authors advocate understanding laws in reference to reliable regularities, causes as not being strictly Newtonian in character, and flexibility with respect to certain formal and philosophical commitments.

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