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Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Matchings

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2014Algorithmic Mechanism Design63 cited
2012Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian59 cited
2011From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms58 cited
2010Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design

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49 cited

2013Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations47 cited

2013Bayesian Mechanism Design46 cited

2013Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and Other Generalizations40 cited

2012Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers34 cited

2017A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements34 cited