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The last period problem in politics: Do congressional representatives not subject to a reelection constraint alter their voting behavior?
11 references·4 citing·30 second hop
The last period problem in politics: Do congressional representatives not subject to a reelection constraint alter their voting behavior? (1990)The last period problem in politics: Do c…The Theory of Economic Regulation (2021)The Theory of Economic Regula…Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Production, Information Costs…The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions (1990)The Apparent Ideological Beha…The Rationality of Ideology (1989)The Rationality of IdeologyPolitical cheating (1987)Political cheatingConstituent Interest and Congressional Voting (1984)Constituent Interest and Cong…Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics (1984)Capture and Ideology in the E…Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting (1979)Self-Interest, Ideology, and …Toward a More General Theory of Regulation (1976)Toward a More General Theory …Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)The Theory of Economic Regula…(Non)renewable Terms and Judicial Independence in the European Court of Human Rights (2021)(Non)renewable Terms and Judi…Drawing Your Senator from a Jar:Term Length and Legislative Behavior (2015)Drawing Your Senator from a J…Unfastening the Electoral Connection: The Behavior of U.S. Representatives when Reelection Is No Longer a Factor (1994)Unfastening the Electoral Con…A critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature (1992)A critical review and an exte…An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years (1995)Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House (2004)Mixing Business With Politics: A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Outcomes of Corporate Political Activity (2010)The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. (1966)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians (1989)Ideology, voting, and shirking (1993)On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking (1993)The Nature of the Firm (1937)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Law and Finance (1998)The Regulation of Entry (2000)The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century (2003)Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (2014)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senate Ideology (1996)Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence (1996)Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation (2004)Direct Democracy Works (2005)The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis (2010)Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities (2013)A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence (1983)World Investment Report (2017)
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References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
  • 1971The Theory of Economic Regulation8,084 cited
  • 2021The Theory of Economic Regulation5,483 cited
  • 1976Toward a More General Theory of Regulation4,771 cited
  • 1984Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics724 cited
  • 1984Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting542 cited
  • 1979Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting404 cited
  • 1990The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions341 cited
  • 1989The Rationality of Ideology139 cited
  • 1987Political cheating135 cited

Cited by

  • 1992A critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature94 cited
  • 2015Drawing Your Senator from a Jar:Term Length and Legislative Behavior84 cited
  • 1994Unfastening the Electoral Connection: The Behavior of U.S. Representatives when Reelection Is No Longer a Factor73 cited
  • 2021(Non)renewable Terms and Judicial Independence in the European Court of Human Rights

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14 cited