Why Doesn't the Bulgarian Judiciary Prosecute Corruption?

Maria Popova

30 citations0/0 files storedProblems of Post-Communism

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Judicial and Constitutional Studies Corruption and Economic Development Legal Systems and Judicial Processes

Abstract

Bulgaria's experience with the prosecution of political corruption suggests that increasing the power and institutional independence of the courts in new democracies does not guarantee that judges will be committed to upholding the rule of law.

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