Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence

Nuno M. Garoupa · Matteo Rizzolli

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Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems Criminal Justice and Penology Legal and Constitutional Studies

Abstract

The conventional result of the theory of the public enforcement of law is that wrongful convictions of innocents are detrimental to deterrence. This proposition has been challenged recently. In some cases, wrongful convictions do not jeopardize deterrence, because they influence equally the innocent and the guilty. Therefore deterrence does not change. We show that, in general, wrongful convictions do lower deterrence. We prove that wrongful convictions do not jeopardize deterrence only in very limited circumstances or under unlikely assumptions.

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References

1968Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 1986Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error 1994Accuracy in the Determination of Liability 2011Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence 1970On the Economics of Law and Order 2012Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence 2006Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?2011A Utilitarian Justification for Heightened Standards of Proof in Criminal Trials

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