In Defence of Associative Political Obligations: Part One

Abstract

Part One of this article seeks to defend the idea of associative political obligations against a number of criticisms that have been advanced opposing it. The purpose of this defence is not to demonstrate that the associative account is therefore the best explanation of political obligations, but only that the principal reasons which have been given for rejecting it are much less compelling than its critics maintain. The argument focuses in particular on the various criticisms advanced by A. John Simmons. Two general lines of defence figure especially prominently. First, it is shown how many of the criticisms in one way or another ultimately rest on the assumption that political obligations must be voluntarily acquired, when it is just this assumption that is contested by an associative account. Secondly, it rebuts the charge that the idea of associative obligations faces a particular problem because it entails the view that members must have obligations to associations or groups that are evil. While it is not claimed that the idea of associative political obligations is entirely without difficulties, it is contended that stories of its demise are greatly exaggerated, and in this respect the ground is laid for Part Two of the article, which sketches a particular account of associative political obligations.

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