Trust, Accountability, and Sales Agents' Dueling Loyalties

Nancy B. Kurland

20 citations0/0 files storedBusiness Ethics Quarterly

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Ethics in Business and Education Accounting and Organizational Management Securities Regulation and Market Practices

Abstract

Abstract This paper argues that current accountability mechanisms are inadequate to ensure that straight-commissioned agents meet their fiduciary obligations to their clients. In doing so, using agency theory, it revisits how the straight-commission compensation system creates agents’ dueling loyalties and recommends mechanisms of accountability organizations, agents, and/or clients can recognize and employ to ensure agents’ fiduciary obligations to their clients.

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References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1984The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration 1983Separation of Ownership and Control 1989Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review 1973The nature of human values 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization 1973The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.1993Factors Affecting Trust in Market Research Relationships

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2010A Theoretical Comparison of the Models of Prevention of Research Misconduct

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