The Role of Monitoring in Reducing the Moral Hazard Problem Associated with Government Guarantees: Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry

Elijah Brewer · Thomas H. Mondschean · Philip E. Strahan

53 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Risk & Insurance

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Insurance and Financial Risk Management Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Corporate Finance and Governance

Abstract

Elijah Brewer, III, Thomas S. Mondschean, Philip E. Strahan, The Role of Monitoring in Reducing the Moral Hazard Problem Associated with Government Guarantees: Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 64, No. 2, Symposium on Financial Risk Management in Insurance Firms (Jun., 1997), pp. 301-322

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 53 citations exist upstream.

References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1988Management ownership and market valuation 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences 1977An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory 1997Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding Companies 1990Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking 1966Pooling Cross Section and Time Series Data in the Estimation of a Dynamic Model: The Demand for Natural Gas 1984Deregulation and bank financial policy

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.