Joint Ownership of a Convex Technology: Comparison of Three Solutions

Herve J. Moulin

99 citations0/0 files storedThe Review of Economic Studies

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Cooperative Studies and Economics Economic theories and models

Abstract

A given set of agents jointly own and operate a decreasing returns to scale technology (with a single input and a single output). They all contribute some input and receive some of the output. What first best allocation is equitable? We discuss three allocation mechanisms. The Equal Benefits solution gives every agent the same benefit, computed at the supporting price. The Equal Returns solution equalizes returns (output shares/input contributions) across agents. The Constant Returns Equivalent solution gives every agent his indirect utility level at some common price of output relative to input. A lower and an upper bound on individual welfares play a key role in these axiomatic characterisation results.

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References

1950The Bargaining Problem 2018Anarchy, State, and Utopia 2018What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources 1979The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility 1986Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare 1985Equality of Talent 1983The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey 1986The Mismarriage of Bargaining Theory and Distributive Justice

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1999Cooperative production with unequal skills: The solidarity approach to compensation 1990Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems 2011Compensation and Responsibilityprotect11The last substantial revision of this survey was made in 2005. Some new works on compensation and responsibility have been done since then. We refer the reader to Fleurbaey (2008) for updates.1995THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL SENTIMENTS: THE CASE OF ENVY 1990Uniform externalities 1998An equal right solution to the compensation–responsibility dilemma

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