Cheap talk games have been widely used to analyze situations in which a policy maker needs expert advice. In previous work, agent uncertainty has almost always been modeled using a single-dimensional state variable. In this paper we prove that the dimensionality of the uncertain variable has an important qualitative impact on results and yields interesting insights into the \\mechanics " of information transmission. Contrary to the unidimensional case, with more than one dimension full transmission of information in all states of nature is typically possible, provided a very simple and intuitive condition is satis¯ed. What really matters in transmission of information is the local behavior senders ' indi®erence curves at the ideal point of the policy maker (receiver), not the proximity of players ' ideal point. This may explain the apparent con°ict between informational theories of committees and the empirical evidence on the poor alignment of preferences between the Floor and committees in legislative organizations.
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 485 citations exist upstream.