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EXPLORING THE PROOF PARADOXES
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EXPLORING THE PROOF PARADOXES (2008)EXPLORING THE PROOF PARADOXESThe Philosophy of Legal Proof (2024)The Philosophy of Legal ProofKnowledge and Legal Proof (2022)Knowledge and Legal ProofPrivacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence (2021)Privacy rights and ‘naked’ st…Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified (2021)Four Arguments for Denying th…Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases: A Review and New Evidence (2020)Knowledge Attributions and Lo…The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof (2019)The Reasonable and the Releva…Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence (2019)Rehabilitating Statistical Ev…Justification, knowledge, and normality (2019)Justification, knowledge, and…Epistemology and the law: why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases (2019)Epistemology and the law: why…Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict? (2018)Trial by Statistics: Is a Hig…SAFETY VS. SENSITIVITY: POSSIBLE WORLDS AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2018)SAFETY VS. SENSITIVITY: POSSI…Legal burdens of proof and statistical evidence (2018)Legal burdens of proof and st…When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction? (2017)When Does Evidence Suffice fo…Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law (2017)Truth, knowledge, and the sta…The Burdens of Proof (2016)The Burdens of ProofTwo Meanings of ‘Reasonableness’: Dispelling the ‘Floating’ Reasonable Doubt (2013)Two Meanings of ‘Reasonablene…The Logic of Scientific Discovery. (1959)The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. (1994)Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011)Can the Reasonable Doubt Standard be Justified? A Reconstructed Dialogue (2018)Imprecise Probability and the Measurement of Keynes's "Weight of Arguments" (2018)Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk (2020)Philosophical Explanations. (1983)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Idealization in Epistemology (2023)Epistemology and Cognition (1987)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge (1976)Solving the Skeptical Problem (1995)Recent work on the proof paradox (2020)Naming and Necessity (1972)Language, thought and other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism. (1987)Knowledge and Lotteries (2003)The disvalue of knowledge (2019)The Moral Grounds of Reasonably Mistaken Self‐Defense (2020)The Skeptic and the Dogmatist (2000)The Hardest Paradox for Closure (2020)The normality of error (2021)Without Justification (2007)Elusive knowledge (1996)An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690)A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957)The Modularity of Mind (1983)Against Knowledge Closure (2019)Knowledge as Justified True Belief (2021)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding (2021)
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  • 2018Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?34 cited
  • 2013Two Meanings of ‘Reasonableness’: Dispelling the ‘Floating’ Reasonable Doubt33 cited
  • 2021Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence33 cited
  • 2019Epistemology and the law: why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases28 cited
  • 2020Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases: A Review and New Evidence22 cited

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  • 2024The Philosophy of Legal Proof21 cited