Article1983

Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories

844 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Political Science Review

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

Electoral Systems and Political Participation Gender Politics and Representation Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

A formal model of electoral behavior is developed under the assumption that candidates have policy preferences as well as an interest in winning per se. This model is shown to have an equilibrium in a k-issue space when there are two candidates. The implications of this model are compared to the implications of the Downsian-type model where candidates are interested only in winning. Testable propositions are derived via the use of comparative statics. The results of recent studies are shown to coincide with the synthesis model but not the pure Downsian model. The theoretical model bridges the gap between formal theory and empirical research and unifies a variety of seemingly unrelated studies.

Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 844 citations exist upstream.

References

1958An Economic Theory of Democracy.1997Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 1929Stability in Competition 1990Stability in Competition 1975Congress, The Electoral Connection 1951Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.1977Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy 1975Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew

Cited by

1996Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics 2012A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics 2004Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House 2001A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage 1995The Political Economy of Budget Deficits 1994Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice 2005Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting 1984

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.