Article1985

Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information

564 citations0/0 files storedMathematics of Operations Research

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

We study games with incomplete information from a point of view which emphasizes the empirical predictions arising from game-theoretic models. Using the notion of “distributional” strategies, we prove four main theorems: (i) a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem, (ii) a pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem, (iii) a pure-strategy ϵ-equilibrium existence theorem, and (iv) a theorem describing how the set of equilibria of a game varies with the parameters of the game.

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References

1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS 1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding 1975Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games 1982Reputation and imperfect information 1982Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence 1974Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies 1952A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*1968Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game

Cited by

1982Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis 2001Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information 1991Empirical models of discrete games 2013Game Theory 2008All-Pay Contests 1988An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information 2005Complementarities and Games: New Developments

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