Capital Structure of Portuguese Service Industries: A Panel Data Analysis

Abstract

Using panel data for the period 1999–2003, this study shows that internal and external financing are not perfect substitutes, not corroborating the theorem of Modigliani and Miller. Portuguese service industries prefer internal to external financing, corroborating Pecking Order theory. The bigger the size of the company, the greater the level of debt, corroborating Trade-Off and Signalling theories. The negative relationship between the amount of fixed capital and debt corroborates Agency theory. The results allow us to conclude that debt contributes to improving management efficiency, agency problems between shareholders and creditors having little relevance.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 24 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.