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A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs

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References

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1980A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence1,648 cited
1983Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns1,002 cited
1974Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis950 cited
1989Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion406 cited
1978A simulation study of income tax evasion391 cited
1989Strikes, Free Riders, and Social Customs118 cited

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2002Tax evasion, civic duty and the law abiding citizen287 cited
2015Tax compliance and enforcement in the pampas evidence from a field experiment285 cited
2009Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers282 cited
2010Cheating, emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion232 cited
1997Why people pay taxes: From a conventional economic model to a model of social convention214 cited
2017FROM THE LAB TO THE FIELD: A REVIEW OF TAX EXPERIMENTS207 cited
2013The effect of tax enforcement on tax morale202 cited
2006Dynamic behaviour in tax evasion: An experimental approach198 cited

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1998Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance187 cited

2012APPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS TO TAX EVASION183 cited

2013Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey182 cited

2009Tax evasion, tax morale and policy maker's effectiveness155 cited

2008Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior152 cited

2012Empathy, sympathy, and tax compliance132 cited

2014Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands125 cited

2016When You Know Your Neighbour Pays Taxes: Information, Peer Effects and Tax Compliance120 cited