A two-stage within subjects design was used to compare decisions based on numerically and verbally expressed probabilities. In Stage 1, subjects determined approximate equivalences between vague probability expressions, numerical probabilities, and graphical displays. Subsequently, in Stage 2 they bid for (Experiment 1J or rated (Experiment 2) gambles based on the previously equated verbal, numerical, and graphical descriptors. In Stage 1, numerical and verbal judgments were reliable, internally consistent, and monotonically related to the displayed probabilities. However, the numerical judgments were significantly superior in all respects because they were much less variable within and between subjects. In Stage 2, response times, bids, and ratings were inconsistent with both of two opposing sets of predictions, one assuming that imprecise gambles will be avoided and the other that verbal probabilities will be preferred. The entire pattern of results is explained by means of a general model of decision making with vague probabilities which assumes that in the present task, when presented with a vague probability word, people focus on an implied probability interval and sample values within it to resolve the vagueness prior to forming a bid or a rating. Subjective probability (SP) is a basic concept in all models of individual decision making under uncertainty. In one class of models, functions of SP are used to weight the utilities, or values, of the basic outcomes to yield a global assessment of goodness for each alternative. This class includes the traditional Subjectively Expected Utility model (Savage, 1954) and
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