No open-access location is known for this record yet.
No open-access location is known for this record yet.
The Modigliani and Miller propositions on the irrelevancy of capital structure and dividends are shown to be valid in a large class of models with asymmetric information. The main assumption is that managerial compensation is chosen optimally. This differs from most of the recent articles on this topic, which impose by fiat a suboptimal contract. Even when imperfections internal to the firm preclude optimal investment, there is a separation between incentives and financing. We conclude that corporations should move toward contracts with better incentives, and that new models should be built that recognize the limitations to optimal contracting.
Loading…
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 252 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.