EC Compliance with WTO Law: The Interplay of Law and Politics

Abstract

This article analyses the interplay of international law and domestic politics in producing compliance with GATT/WTO law. It seeks to assess whether the strengthening of GATT dispute settlement under the WTO has led to greater compliance on the part of the European Community. In doing so, it focuses on cases of trade-restrictive regulatory process standards. From an in-depth analysis of two cases in which the EC adopted such standards, the article concludes that the change from GATT to WTO has indeed led to a greater awareness of international trade law considerations within the EC. Nevertheless, compliance with GATT/WTO law is not unconditional. Rather, the case studies point to two factors that are particularly important in understanding compliance. First, resorting to the WTO is most effective as a threat before the trade-restrictive standards are implemented; once these standards are implemented, it becomes progressively more difficult to have them withdrawn. Second, the role of European trade officials is crucial in producing compliance; although the role of trade officials within the EC has become stronger since the creation of the WTO, their influence on a decision to comply depends crucially on their capacity to exclude other interests from the decision-making process.

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