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Observable Contracts as Commitments: Interdependent Contracts and Moral Hazard
16 references·2 citing·41 second hop
Observable Contracts as Commitments: Interdependent Contracts and Moral Hazard (2006)Observable Contracts as Commitments: Inte…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)An Analysis of the Principal-…Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments (1991)Game-Playing Agents: Unobserv…Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty (1989)Supply Function Equilibria in…Oligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability effect (1989)Oligopoly and financial struc…Delegation and the theory of the firm (1989)Delegation and the theory of …The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives (1987)The Strategic Choice of Manag…Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly (1986)Optimal Trade and Industrial …Common Agency (1986)Common AgencyExport subsidies and international market share rivalry (1985)Export subsidies and internat…Delegation and the Theory of the Firm (1985)Delegation and the Theory of …Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly (1984)Equilibrium Incentives in Oli…International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy (1983)International R & D Rivalry a…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)An Analysis of the Principal-…Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems (1982)Optimal coordination mechanis…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityAuctions of Shares (1979)Auctions of SharesEconomic consequences of managerial compensation contract disclosure (2022)Economic consequences of mana…Customer or Complementor? Intercarrier Compensation with Two‐Sided Benefits (2011)Customer or Complementor? Int…Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)The Theory of Corporate Finance (2006)Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy? (2013)How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises? (2013)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Richard M. Cyert & James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of The Firm, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963, 332 s. (1964)Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice (1997)Executive compensation (2008)Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting (2011)Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information (2011)Two-Person Cooperative Games (1953)Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly (1984)Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature (1999)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Competition in two-sided markets (2006)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing (1977)The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence (1980)The narrow moving band, the Dutch disease, and the competitive consequences of Mrs. Thatcher (1987)Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market (1979)Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation (1982)Is Free Trade Passé? (1987)Technological Capabilities and Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the United States (1991)Trade, Growth, and the Environment (2004)Trade, Growth, and the Environment (2004)Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Agency Relationships in Marketing: A Review of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related Theories (1992)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
  • 1985Export subsidies and international market share rivalry1,935 cited
  • 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,933 cited
  • 1989Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty1,384 cited
  • 1986Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly1,119 cited
  • 1989Oligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability effect1,084 cited
  • 1987The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives960 cited
  • 1982Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems913 cited
  • 1983International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy826 cited
  • 1985Delegation and the Theory of the Firm786 cited
  • 1979Auctions of Shares733 cited
  • 1984Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly688 cited
  • 1989Delegation and the theory of the firm670 cited
  • 1986Common Agency474 cited
  • 1991Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments376 cited

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Cited by

  • 2011Customer or Complementor? Intercarrier Compensation with Two‐Sided Benefits27 cited
  • 2022Economic consequences of managerial compensation contract disclosure14 cited