Corporatism, Administrative Regimes and the Mis‐management of Public Funds

Abstract

Danish democracy has strong corporatist characteristics. The implication is that interest organizations are integrated in both policy‐making and policy implementation. This article deals with policy implementation. A distinction between different administrative regimes is developed. The proposition advanced here is that variations with respect to the involvement of interest organizations in administrative execution of public policy have consequences for administrative behavior. A number of scandals revealed during recent years concerning the management of public funds provide the basis of the empirical analysis. The conclusion is that with increased involvement of interest organizations in the administrative implementation of policy, legal norms are superseded by political norms, while the traditional institutions of administrative accountability are weakened.

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