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Why are CEOS Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation · Study

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PreprintWhy are CEOS Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation

Lucian A. Taylor2009

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Preprintgreen2009

Why are CEOS Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation

Lucian A. Taylor

108 citations·0/0 files stored·SSRN Electronic Journal

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Corporate Finance and Governance Corporate Insolvency and Governance Organizational Management and Leadership

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References

1988Outside directors and CEO turnover 1989A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response Models Without Numerical Integration 1988Stock prices and top management changes 1989Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization Estimators 1999CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis 1997CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis 1985Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance 2001Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective

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2011What Do Boards Really Do? Evidence from Minutes of Board Meetings 2013Learning About CEO Ability and Stock Return Volatility 2018Bid anticipation, information revelation, and merger gains 2017A Theory of Corporate Boards and Forced CEO Turnover 2014The death of the deal: Are withdrawn acquisition deals informative of CEO quality?2012Idiosyncratic Risk and the Manager

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Details

Year2009

Typepreprint

Published2009-01-01

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal

ISSN-L1556-5068

Languageen

Citations108

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.2139/ssrn.1342547

openalex_workW2045857744

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2012Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts and Challenges

2016Diversification and cash dynamics