Aristotle's account of Friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics

Abstract

The Nicomachean Ethics, as is well known, distinguishes three types of friendship the friendship of goodness, the friendship of pleasure, and the friendship of utility. How are these three types of friendship supposed to be related to one another? It has often been said that Aristotle regards them as focally related1, but W. W. Fortenbaugh has recently argued against this and suggested that the essential connection is provided by the notion of analogy2. It seems to me, however, that neither Fortenbaugh nor his opponents are correct. It will be the central claim of this paper that Aristotle relates the three types of friendship not by appeal either to the notion of analogical or to that of focal homonymy, but in terms of a third and little noticed form of homonymy: his view, very roughly expressed, is that all three forms of friendship do in a sense meet the definitional requirements for friendship but that whereas the friendship of goodness does so straightforwardly, the friendships of pleasure and of utility do so only in a way or only with certain qualifications. My programme is rather complex. Fortenbaugh's claim, that the three types of friendship are analogically related, is part of a wider interpretation of NE VIII and IX and cannot be considered in isolation from this. I shall therefore begin in Part I by examining Fortenbaugh's case for his interpretation. In Part II I shall sketch out an alternative interpretation, which, I believe, more accurately reflects Aristotle's view of the relationship between the various forms of friendship. And finally in Part III I shall try to clarify the view I have attributed to Aristotle by defending it against the charge that it does after all reintroduce focal homonymy into his account.

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