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Precommitment by central bank independence
16 references·16 citing·37 second hopsampled
Precommitment by central bank independence (1991)Precommitment by central bank independenceMacroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics (2012)Macroeconomic Policy, Credibi…The Role of Monetary Policy (1995)The Role of Monetary PolicyA bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank (1992)A bargaining model of partisa…The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: A concrete example (1987)The case for rules in the con…Reputational constraints on monetary policy (1987)Reputational constraints on m…Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information (1986)Reputation in a model of mone…A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information (1986)A Theory of Ambiguity, Credib…The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)The Optimal Degree of Commitm…Inflation and Reputation (1985)Inflation and ReputationSequential Equilibria (1982)Sequential EquilibriaINFLATION IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1979)INFLATION IN THE THEORY OF PU…Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Rules Rather than Discretion:…The Political Business Cycle (1975)The Political Business CycleInflation in the Theory of Public Finance (1973)Inflation in the Theory of Pu…The Optimum Quantity of Money (1970)The Optimum Quantity of MoneyThe Strategy of Conflict (1960)The Strategy of ConflictThe ultimate determinants of central bank independence (2013)The ultimate determinants of …Accountability and Independent Central Banks: Europeans and Distrust of the European Central Bank (2010)Accountability and Independen…Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls (2005)Time inconsistency of monetar…Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: A Reply (2003)Why Money Talks and Wealth Wh…The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence (2002)The Political Economy of Infl…Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re-examination (2001)Do We Really Need Central Ban…Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique (2000)Why Money Talks and Wealth Wh…Optimal Central Bank Conservativeness in an Open Economy (2000)Optimal Central Bank Conserva…Long-term appointment of central bankers: costs and benefits (2000)Long-term appointment of cent…Central bank independence and the commitment to monetary stability: The case of the German Bundesbank (1998)Central bank independence and…Time Consistent Collection of Optimal Seigniorage: A Unifying Framework (1997)Time Consistent Collection of…The Gold Standard, Bretton Woods and Other Monetary Regimes: A Historical Appraisal (1996)The Gold Standard, Bretton Wo…Is Japan special? Monetary linkages and price stability (1996)Is Japan special? Monetary li…The advantages of tying Austria's hands: The success of the hard currency strategy (1995)The advantages of tying Austr…The algebra of price stability (1994)The algebra of price stabilityA Monetary Constitution Case for an Independent European Central Bank (1992)A Monetary Constitution Case …Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964 (1971)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model (1981)Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking (1986)Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers (1994)Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs. (1973)Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts (1980)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model (1983)Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule (1999)Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates (2000)Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is It Effective and, If So, How Does It Work? (2001)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective (1999)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements (1961)Rational Expectations, the Real Rate of Interest, and the Natural Rate of Unemployment (1973)Equilibria under ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary and fiscal policies (1991)Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism (1995)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information (1997)International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs (2000)The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results (2008)Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy (1977)Trust and Growth (2001)Democracy and dictatorship revisited (2009)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games (1988)Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (2010)Econometric policy evaluation: A critique (1976)Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy (2005)Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty* (2016)The Exchange Rate And The Balance of Payments In The Short Run and in The Long Run: A Monetary Approach (1977)Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations* *I have greatly benefited from comments received at Johns Hopkins University, Georgetown University, the Macro Lunch Group of the University of Pennsylvania, MIT, and the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. I am particularly indebted to Matt Canzoneri, Sara Guerschanik-Calvo, Joseph Harrington, Jr, Elhanan Helpman, Nissan Leviatan, Maury Obstfeld, Assaf Razin, Sweder van Wijnbergen and two anonymous referees. The research on this paper was partly done while I was a visiting scholar at the Research Department of the Internationed Monetary Fund, and it was partially funded by the National Science Foundation. However, any opinions expressed are entirely my own and not those of any of the above institutions. This paper has already been published in the The American Economic Review, 78, 4, September 1988, pp. 647–661. (1989)When It Rains, It Pours: Procyclical Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Policies (2004)An Evolutionary Approach to Norms (1986)Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles (1987)Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (1994)
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References

  • 1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans7,896 cited
  • 1960The Strategy of Conflict7,683 cited
  • 1975The Political Business Cycle3,951 cited
  • 1995The Role of Monetary Policy3,796 cited
  • 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target3,687 cited
  • 1982Sequential Equilibria1,703 cited
  • 1986A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information1,287 cited
  • 2012Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics692 cited
  • 1973Inflation in the Theory of Public Finance410 cited
  • 1985Inflation and Reputation409 cited
  • 1979INFLATION IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE336 cited
  • 1986Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information289 cited
  • 1970The Optimum Quantity of Money281 cited
  • 1987Reputational constraints on monetary policy175 cited
  • 1987The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: A concrete example120 cited
  • 1992A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank110 cited

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Cited by

  • 2010Accountability and Independent Central Banks: Europeans and Distrust of the European Central Bank86 cited
  • 1995The advantages of tying Austria's hands: The success of the hard currency strategy81 cited
  • 2000Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique55 cited
  • 2003Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: A Reply51 cited
  • 1998Central bank independence and the commitment to monetary stability: The case of the German Bundesbank45 cited
  • 1996The Gold Standard, Bretton Woods and Other Monetary Regimes: A Historical Appraisal35 cited
  • 2001Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re-examination33 cited
  • 2013The ultimate determinants of central bank independence28 cited
  • 1992A Monetary Constitution Case for an Independent European Central Bank24 cited
  • 1997Time Consistent Collection of Optimal Seigniorage: A Unifying Framework19 cited
  • 2002The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence19 cited
  • 2005Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls16 cited
  • 1994The algebra of price stability14 cited
  • 2000Optimal Central Bank Conservativeness in an Open Economy11 cited
  • 1996Is Japan special? Monetary linkages and price stability9 cited
  • 2000Long-term appointment of central bankers: costs and benefits9 cited