Rent Seeking in International Trade: The Great Tomato War

Maury E. Bredahl · Andrew Schmitz · Jimmye S. Hillman

69 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Global trade and economics Agricultural economics and policies Global trade, sustainability, and social impact

Abstract

Abstract This paper presents a model of international rent‐seeking activities by producers in both exporting and importing nations. The model is applied to the winter vegetable trade between the United States and Mexico. An analysis is made of the attempts to form export/import coalitions. Reasons for these failures are given. Due to past failures to impede trade, essentially free trade in winter vegetables between the two countries exists.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 69 citations exist upstream.

References

2008The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society

Cited by

2011Trade and the Political Economy of Food Standards 2010Understanding International Trade in Agricultural Products: One Hundred Years of Contributions by Agricultural Economists 2015Quality Standards, Value Chains, and International Development 1999Environmental Regulations and Corporate Strategy 2010Trade diversion from tomato suspension agreements 2005Rent Seeking with Politically Contestable Rights to Tariff-rate Import Quotas**1994Marketing Orders as Nontariff Trade Barriers 2010Market and Welfare Impacts of COOL on the U.S.-Mexican Tomato Trade

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.