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Knowledge, assertion and lotteries
7 references·16 citing·41 second hop
Knowledge, assertion and lotteries (1996)Knowledge, assertion and lotteriesElusive knowledge (1996)Elusive knowledgeSolving the Skeptical Problem (1995)Solving the Skeptical ProblemEpistemic Possibilities (1991)Epistemic PossibilitiesHow to be a Fallibilist (1988)How to be a FallibilistPhilosophical explanations (1986)Philosophical explanationsIgnorance: A Case for Scepticism. (1978)Ignorance: A Case for Sceptic…Conclusive reasons (1971)Conclusive reasonsIX—Moral Encroachment (2018)IX—Moral EncroachmentKnowledge as Acceptable Testimony (2017)Knowledge as Acceptable Testi…Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge (2016)Intuitive expertise and intui…Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence (2015)Beliefs, buses and lotteries:…The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox (2011)The Psychological Basis of th…The Normative Role of Knowledge (2011)The Normative Role of Knowled…Justification as the appearance of knowledge (2011)Justification as the appearan…What Else Justification Could Be1 (2010)What Else Justification Could…INSENSITIVITY IS BACK, BABY! (2010)INSENSITIVITY IS BACK, BABY!Assertion, Moore, and Bayes (2008)Assertion, Moore, and BayesThe evidential support theory of conditionals (2007)The evidential support theory…Subjunctivitis (2006)SubjunctivitisKnowledge claims and context: loose use (2006)Knowledge claims and context:…Tracking Truth (2005)Tracking TruthStick To What You Know (2005)Stick To What You KnowWhat Good are Counterexamples? (2003)What Good are Counterexamples?Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure of categories (1975)Studies in the Way of Words (1989)Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (2002)The Concept of Mind (2006)The Intellectual Given (2015)What Is Disinformation? (2015)Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge (1976)Scorekeeping in a language game (1979)Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. (1988)Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge (2002)Putting Logic in its Place (2004)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Epistemic Injustice (2007)Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007)How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment (2019)The relationship between belief and credence (2020)Varieties of Moral Encroachment (2020)The Scientific Image (1980)How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983)Representing and Intervening (1983)Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem (2014)The Modal Account of Luck (2014)VARIETIES OF EXTERNALISM (2014)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (1955)Structural representation and surrogative reasoning (1991)Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (1994)Speaking My Mind (2004)Must We Know What We Say? (2005)Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility (2006)Imagining as a Guide to Possibility (2010)The Skeptic and the Dogmatist (2000)Knowledge and Lotteries (2003)Contemporary debates in epistemology (2005)Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, part II (1989)Moral Realism (2003)The Constitution of Agency (2008)Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction (2010)Epistemic Modals Are Assessment‐Sensitive (2011)Epistemic Luck (2005)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1996Elusive knowledge1,449 cited
  • 1995Solving the Skeptical Problem1,280 cited
  • 1986Philosophical explanations1,061 cited
  • 1988How to be a Fallibilist636 cited
  • 1971Conclusive reasons563 cited
  • 1991Epistemic Possibilities405 cited
  • 1978Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.379 cited

Cited by

  • 2003What Good are Counterexamples?247 cited
  • 2005Tracking Truth205 cited
  • 2018IX—Moral Encroachment179 cited
  • 2010What Else Justification Could Be1175 cited
  • 2011The Normative Role of Knowledge131 cited
  • 2005Stick To What You Know125 cited
  • 2016Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge120 cited
  • 2006Knowledge claims and context: loose use101 cited
  • 2015Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence98 cited
  • 2008Assertion, Moore, and Bayes94 cited

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2017
Knowledge as Acceptable Testimony
88 cited
  • 2011Justification as the appearance of knowledge85 cited
  • 2006Subjunctivitis77 cited
  • 2011The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox76 cited
  • 2010INSENSITIVITY IS BACK, BABY!65 cited
  • 2007The evidential support theory of conditionals61 cited