Article1976

The Non-spatiality of Things in Themselves for Kant

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Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

I. IN THE Aesthet ic Kant argued from the a priori nature of our representation of space (and time) to its and transcendental ideality. By the empirical reality of the representation of space Kant meant its with respect to outer appearances or objects of human experience. Transcendental ideality, on the other hand, refers to its lack of objective validity with respect to the same objects considered as they are in themselves. Appearances, in other words, really are in space, but things in themselves are not. As Kant himself expressed this result:

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1997Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics 1900Kant's gesammelte schriften 1984A Commentary to Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason ”1977Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich 1974The Kant-Eberhard Controversy.

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2012Essays on Kant 2006Transcendental Realism, Empirical Realism and Transcendental Idealism 2000Naturalism and the A Priori

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