Zero Sum Absorbing Games with Incomplete Information on One Side: Asymptotic Analysis

Dinah Rosenberg

28 citations0/0 files storedSIAM Journal on Control and Optimization

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Game Theory and Applications Probability and Statistical Research Adaptive Dynamic Programming Control

Abstract

We prove the existence of the limit of the values of finitely repeated (resp., discounted) absorbing games with incomplete information on one side, as the number of repetitions goes to infinity (resp., the discount factor goes to zero). The main tool is the study of the Shapley operator, for which the value of the $\lambda$-discounted game is a fixed point, and of its derivative with respect to $\lambda$.

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References

1953Stochastic Games 2011Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 1981Stochastic games 1976The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games 1971The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides 1974Repeated Games with Absorbing States 2001An operator approach to zero-sum repeated games 1991“Big Match” with Lack of Information on One Side (III)

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2003Stochastic Games with Incomplete Information

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