Interest Group Influence in City Policy-Making: The Views of Administrators

Abstract

T _ HERE IS conflicting evidence regarding the degree of influence which interest groups exert on the formulation and implementation of public policies in American cities. The proximity of councilpersons to their constitutents is said (Morlan and Hardy 1968) to make them more responsive to interest groups than legislators at any other level of government. Yet, institutional features of the municipal reform movement are believed (Clark 1971; Grimes et al. 1976; Lineberry and Fowler 1967) to have made city governments somewhat resistant to interest group influence. In particular, Lineberry and Fowler (1967: 716) noted that by muting the demands of private regarding groups, the electoral institutions of reformed governments make public policy less responsive to the demands arising out of social conflicts in the population. On the other hand, Northrop and Dutton (1978) concluded that chief executives in reformed cities are more vulnerable to group influence than chief executives in cities without the institutions of the reform

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