Textual interpretation and (international) law reading: the myth of (in)determinacy and the genealogy of meaning

Abstract

Introduction Lawyers find certainties very appealing. Perhaps this is the case because they regard the law as stable and predictable. Law's fundamental certainties lie in its rules. The certainties of lawyers are also found there. Rules are called upon to perform the reassuring function of making us believe that what the law-maker considered to be right or wrong is clearly expressed in them. If there is doubt or ambiguity, objective canons of interpretation can readily be used to solve them. The law can thus regain its stabilising function. Reflections about law and its interpretation, which depart from the practitioner's task of saying what the law is, are often looked down upon and strictly relegated to the narrow boundaries of the academic discourse. To be fair, legal philosophers have long engaged in a debate about what interpretation is and how it works, but the discourse within particular legal disciplines is usually confined to the rules and techniques (rules under the guise of technical tools) that lawyers must follow while interpreting legal provisions. Lately, a certain interest has arisen within the community of international lawyers about interpretation, partly due to its potential use for coping with the phenomenon of fragmentation. Interestingly enough, interpretation is regarded as both the problem, given the increasing number of epistemic communities within the discipline, and the solution, for its potential harmonising effect.

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