The Financial Incumbency Advantage: Causes and Consequences

Alexander Fouirnaies · Andrew B. Hall

191 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Politics

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Electoral Systems and Political Participation Media Influence and Politics Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract

In this article, we use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of incumbency on campaign contributions in the U.S. House and state legislatures. In both settings, incumbency causes approximately a 20–25 percentage-point increase in the share of donations flowing to the incumbent’s party. The effect size does not vary with legislator experience and does not appear to depend on incumbent office-holder benefits. Instead, as we show, the effect is primarily the result of donations from access-oriented interest groups, especially donors from industries under heavy regulation and those with less ideological ties. Given the role of money in elections, the findings suggest that access-oriented interest groups are an important driver of the electoral security of incumbents.

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References

1966The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.1960The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America 1983The Politics of Congressional Elections 2006Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy 1990Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees 1990Estimating Incumbency Advantage Without Bias 1978The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections 1996Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow?

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