A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action

Joel M. Guttman

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic Policies and Impacts

Abstract

The interaction of selfish, rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyzed, in an attempt to explain recent experimental findings as well as real-world cases of voluntary collective action. The model, which allows for more sophisticated behavior than that assumed by the conventional Cournot theory, predicts a higher level of collective action that that theory. The impacts of income effects and of the price elasticity of demand for the public good are given special emphasis.

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