Freedom and forgiveness

Abstract

In the history of philosophy and political thought freedom has meant a number of different things. The author considers several of these meanings and their relevance to psychoanalytic theory. The general argument against freedom that has been mounted in the history of thought, and echoed by Freud, is the thesis of causal determinism; but it is urged here that this in itself is no threat to freedom in the sense of the word required for moral agency: a free choice is one that is caused to some extent by reasons and that is relatively unconstrained both by 'external' and 'internal' forces. Yet because agents are embedded in a causal nexus that includes both the physical world and other people, agency and freedom can be compromised in innumerable ways. Neither freedom nor agency is a condition which we absolutely have or lack, but a matter of degree. Psychoanalytic therapy works toward expanding the capacity for agency and diminishing the constraints of certain internal forces. In the sense defined here, objectivity is an attitude that accepts our embeddedness in the world. With objectivity may come both forgiveness and self-forgiveness, which in turn promote agency.

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