The Rorschach in Forensic Practice

Abstract

The Rorschach is one of the most widely used, openly accepted, and frequently requested tests in forensic psychology practice (Piotrowski, 1996; Meloy, 1991; Weiner, Exner, & Sciara, 1996). Well-trained psychologists with a sophisticated understanding of the individual, psychological constructs, base rates, and conditional probabilities, derive information from the Rorschach beyond what is available from diagnosis, self-report, and interview. The Rorschach helps us describe the complex interaction among psychological, biological, environmental and behavioral domains (Viglione & Perry, 1991). Despite its favorable status in both clinical and forensic settings and a substantial body of literature attesting to its reliability and validity (Weiner, 1996), the Rorschach has been targeted for attack by a small group of “academic” psychologists. Rather than science, the rhetoric and tactics of these detractors has been likened to “advocacy” or politics (Weiner, 2001, p. 7). This bias against the Rorschach is not new. It has existed since the 1920s among American academic psychology departments, despite the research in support of the Rorschach. As a result of this attack, biased articles find their way into publication and eventually into the courtroom. While they do little to promote scientific study (Meyer, 2000) and provide little useful information to the trier of fact, they do present another avenue for challenge when opposing attorneys search for weaknesses in psychological testimony. Forensic psychologists need to prepare for this additional challenge. In this article we summarize some key issues that can aid in defending the Rorschach.

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